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ABSTRACT
Directive 2001/23/EC on the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, aims primarily to protect employees from being placed in a less favourable 
position solely as a result of a transfer of an undertaking. Article 3(3) of the Directive, more 
particularly, provides that, upon a transfer of an undertaking, the new employer is bound by 
terms and conditions agreed in collective agreements on the same terms as applicable to the 
previous employer until the collective agreement terminates, expires or is replaced by another 
one. This thesis explores the case law of the Court of Justice on Article 3(3) of the Directive,
with the aim of analysing how the Court deals with the tension between employees’ and 
employers’ interests, inherent in Directive 2001/23/EC, and how those interests are balanced. 
The Court’s balancing of interests is assessed, both in the light of the aim and nature of the 
Directive and in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, it is placed in the 
broader context of the tension between social and economic rights within the European 
Union. The main conclusions of this analysis are that, overall, the Court is successful in 
ensuring a fair balance between employees’ and employers’ interests in its case law on Article 
3(3) of the Directive. One case, however, departs from this conclusion, as the Court fails to 
give sufficient weight to the employees’ rights, whether assessed in the light of the aim of the 
Directive, the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the increased emphasis on social objectives 
within the Union.
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practical and interesting to write my master thesis on the topic of European employment law. 
The idea for the specific topic of transfers of undertakings was born in a conversation with my 
supervisor, Professor Xavier Groussot, in the fall of 2013 where he brought my attention to 
this new and interesting judgment from the Court of Justice on the subject. The case of Mark 
Alemo-Herron was the inspiration for this thesis but I decided to focus more broadly on all the 
cases of the Court which deal with the transfer of employees’ rights arising from collective 
agreements. I must also admit that my participation in the European Law Moot Court 
Competition 2013-2014, and the profound interest I developed of European constitutional 
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11. INTRODUCTION
When an undertaking is transferred to a new owner, as a result of a legal transfer or a merger, 
the situation of the employees of the undertaking changes, as their employer is replaced by a 
new one. Since this situation could have adverse consequences for the employees, a directive 
was adopted at European Union (‘Union’) level, first in 1977, amended in 1998 and 
consolidated in 2001. Directive 2001/23/EC
1
on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings (the ‘Transfer of Undertakings Directive’ or the ‘Directive’) aims to protect 
employees and to ensure that their rights are safeguarded in the event of a change of 
employer.
2
The idea is that mere change of ownership of an undertaking should not have any
consequences for the employees.
3
However, the interests of the employees in retaining all their rights in the event of a transfer 
of an undertaking can collide with the new employer’s interests in being able to arrange its 
own affairs. This is particularly true for employees’ rights under collective agreements which 
the new employer is not part of. Inherent in the Transfer of Undertakings Directive is, thus, a 
tension between employees’ and employers’ interests.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyse the case law of the Court on Article 3(3) 
of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive. Article 3(3) of the Directive provides that in the 
event of a transfer of an undertaking, the new employer is bound by terms and conditions 
agreed in collective agreements on the same terms as applicable to the previous employer 
until the collective agreement terminates, expires or is replaced by another one. The aim is to 
analyse how the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’ or the ‘Court’) 
deals with the tension between employees’ and employers’ interests, in the context of 
collective agreements and whether the Court is successful in balancing those interests. The 
main focus will be on the case law on Article 3(3) of the Directive, which comprises eight 
judgments. An overview will, however, also be provided of the main conclusions of the 
Court’s case law on Article 3(1), which deals with employees’ rights under individual 
contracts of employment. Before examining and analysing the Court’s case law it is, however, 
necessary to look at the Transfer of Undertakings Directive itself, both in general terms and 
                                                
1
Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16.
2
Recital 3 in the Preamble to the Directive. 
3
Gregor Thüsing, European Labour Law (Verlag C.H. Beck 2013) 105.
2with regard to the relevant provisions for the purpose of this thesis. Apart from relying on the 
Court’s case law, the content of this thesis will be supported by references to legislative texts, 
Preparatory Documents and doctrine, in the field of, inter alia, Union social policy and 
employment law.
The second chapter of this thesis contains a general discussion on the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive. The historical context of the Directive will be examined and an 
overview given of the developments of European employment law and social policy (chapter 
2.1). The aim and nature of the Directive will be assessed (chapter 2.2) and its amendments 
traced (chapter 2.3). An overview will also be given of the structure and main provisions of 
the Directive (chapter 2.4). In the third and fourth chapter the focus will shift towards Article 
3 of the Directive more particularly, which provides for the transfer of employment 
relationships to the new employer. Before the case law on Article 3(3) on rights arising from 
collective agreements is scrutinised, it is appropriate to look at the main conclusions of the 
Court’s case law on Article 3(1) of the Directive, since those provisions are closely linked 
(chapter 3). Chapter 4 contains general comments on the provision in Article 3(3) of the 
Directive (4.1), a short overview of the different rules on collective agreements in the 
Member States (4.2) and, lastly, summaries of the cases where the Court has dealt with 
Article 3(3) of the Directive and rights arising from collective agreements (4.3).
In the analysis chapter (chapter 5) the Court’s case law on Article 3(3) of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive will be examined and analysed in detail. The main conclusions of the 
case law will be summed up (chapter 5.1) and an attempt made to answer whether the Court 
has been successful in balancing the competing interests inherent in the Directive, both in the 
light of the aim and nature of the Directive (chapter 5.2) as well as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union
4
(the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ or the 
‘Charter’) (chapter 5.3). Lastly, the focus will shift to the broader issue of the tension between 
economic and social rights and the impact of the Lisbon Treaty in that context (chapter 5.4).
Finally, in the concluding chapter, the main content and conclusions of the thesis will be 
summed up. 
                                                
4
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/02.
32. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS 
DIRECTIVE
2.1. The Historical Context of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive – Developments 
of European Employment Law and Social Policy since the Rome Treaty 
The original objectives of the European Economic Community were economic in nature. 
Article 2 of the Rome Treaty of 1957 stated:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.
The common market should consist of free movement of labour, goods, services and capital. 
Workers were, thus, merely seen as a production factor. The idea was that economic 
integration through the common market would ensure optimum rate of economic growth and 
optimum allocation of resources which then would lead to the improvement of living and 
working conditions.
5
Therefore, the main motivation for social policy provisions lay in 
presuppositions of economic integration.
6
The Rome Treaty did contain a Title on Social Policy but its provisions were limited in scope 
and did not confer legally enforceable rights. The first provision of that Title was Article 117 
EEC,
7
which stipulated that the Member States ‘agree upon the need to promote improved 
working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible 
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained’.
8
Moreover, the competence 
of the Community to adopt secondary legislation in the field of employment law
9
was very 
limited. The only explicit legal basis was Article 100 EEC,
10
which stipulated that the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, could issue directives for 
the approximation of provisions that directly affected the establishment or functioning of the 
common market. Consequently, development of employment law at Community level was
                                                
5
Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 4-5; Brian Bercusson, 
European Labour Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 334.
6
Kaarlo Tuori, ‘European social constitution: between solidarity and access justice’ in K. Purnhagen and P. Rott 
(eds) Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation (Springer forthcoming 2014) 26.
7
A similar provision is now in Article 151 TFEU.
8
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 4.
9
The term ‘employment law’ will be used simultaneously for ‘employment law’ and ‘labour law’.
10
A similar provision is now in Article 115 TFEU.
4only relevant if it was useful for promoting the establishment or functioning of the common 
market.
11
There was little development of European social and employment law during the first decade 
of the common market.
12
The early 1970s, however, witnessed a change of approach, 
explained in part by social unrest in Western Europe in 1968 and an economic recession in 
Europe following the twin oil shocks of the 1970s. At the time of the accession of three new 
Member States, the Heads of State and Government issued a communiqué of the Paris 
Summit in 1972, noting that the Member States ‘attached as much importance to vigorous 
action in the social field as to the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union’.
13
It 
became evident that the growth-based ideology of the European Economic Community was 
not working as expected and that a social dimension was needed. The view was that the 
Community needed a human face to demonstrate that it was more than a device enabling 
business to exploit the common market. There were also concerns that the restructuring 
brought about by the removal of barriers to trade at the European level could be detrimental to 
individual employees.
14
This led to the Commission adopting the Social Action Programme in 1974. The programme
contained three objectives, i.e. to attain full and better employment in the Community, to 
improve living and working conditions and to increase both the involvement of management 
and labour in the economic and social decisions of the Community and also of employees in 
the life of the undertaking.
15
Quite extensive legislative activity resulted from this Social 
Action Programme, which was, however, confined to certain areas of employment law, and 
not the social sphere in the broader sense.
16
A part of this wave of legislative activity was the adoption of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive of 14 February 1977.
17
Other directives that formed part of this wave and were also 
intended to address the social consequences of economic change were Directive 
                                                
11
Ruth Nielsen, EU Labour Law (2nd edn, DJØF Publishing 2013) 59.
12
Jari Hellsten, From Internal Market Regulation to European Labour Law, First Article (Helsinki University 
Print 2007) 7.
13
EC Bull. 10/1972, para 6.
14
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 8-9, 619; Thüsing (n 3) 105.
15
Council Resolution concerning a Social Action Programme [1974] OJ C13/1.
16
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 9-10.
17
Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses [1977] OJ L61/26.
575/129/EEC
18
on collective redundancy and Directive 80/987/EEC
19
that concerned 
insolvency.
20
The early 1980s were characterised by general stagnation of economic development and the 
enthusiasm for developing European employment and social law began to fade. In times of 
decreasing economic growth and increasing unemployment, the conservative Thatcher 
government in the UK insisted on strict limits to the growth of Community social policy. It
strongly advocated deregulation of the labour markets in order to ensure maximum flexibility 
of the workforce and enable business to compete in a global market. Although this view was 
contrary to the stance adopted by the Commission, which did not equate flexibility with 
deregulation and refused to abandon its commitment to safeguarding the rights of employees, 
all social policy measures required unanimity in the Council which meant that the UK could 
veto any proposal to which it was opposed.
21
A second wave of legislative activity in the field of employment law was facilitated by the 
Single European Act of 1987, as a number of amendments were made to the legal basis 
provisions so as to increase the legislative competences of the Community in the field of 
employment law. The amended provisions represented an important shift in thinking, as they 
viewed the protection of labour as a value in its own right and demonstrated that 
harmonisation of labour standard by the Community would merely take the form of setting a 
floor of basic rights. A part from that, however, the Single European Act made few 
concessions to those who had argued for adding a social dimension to the single market 
programme. Furthermore, the deadline for completion of the single market was concerned 
with the realisation of the four freedoms without any mention being made of social policy.
22
The lack of a true social dimension of the Single European Act did prompt some concerns 
about the success of the single market programme and about the detrimental consequences the 
programme could have on employees. There was a growing recognition that social and 
economic conditions were intertwined and that economic efficiency had to be balanced by 
objectives to humanise the market.
23
                                                
18
Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L48/29.
19
Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ L283/23.
20
Hellsten, First Article (n 12) 7-8; Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 619; Thüsing (n 3) 105-106.
21
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 10; Thüsing (n 3) 5.
22
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 11-12; Tuori (n 6) 26.
23
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 12-13.
6A step in the direction of a more social dimension was taken with the signing of the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (the ‘Community Social 
Charter’) in 1989. Although it was only adopted as a Declaration of the European Council, 
with the UK opting out, and lacked free standing legal effect, it did contain 26 social rights 
which the Member States had the responsibility to guarantee and it did recognise that the 
same importance should be attached to the social and economic aspects of the European
Community. Moreover, the Community Social Charter did prove important for the
development of a social dimension, as the Commission adopted a Social Charter Action 
Programme
24
in order to achieve the objectives set out in the Charter, which led to the 
adoption of a number of directives in the field of employment law.
25
  
The Member States’ desire for a social dimension to accompany the single market programme 
led to the changes brought about by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
26
The Agreement on 
Social Policy, which was annexed to the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty and not 
incorporated into the Treaty due to resistance by the UK, represented a significant surge in the 
development of European employment law. The importance of the Agreement on Social 
Policy lay in the fact that it broadened the scope of Community competence in the social field 
and increased the areas of qualified majority voting. It, moreover, envisaged a greater role for 
social partners and helped to rebalance the disequilibrium between the economic and social 
dimension inherent in the original Rome Treaty.
27
By the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the Agreement on Social Policy was incorporated into the 
Treaty and a new Employment Title was added.
28
The Commission’s attempts during the 
1990s to create a better mix between economic and social policies culminated with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the inclusion of the Employment Title represented the recognition of 
increased inter-dependencies between Community economic policy and national social 
policy.
29
Furthermore, Article 117 EC
30
was revised so as to include a reference to 
‘fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter [of the Council 
                                                
24
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission concerning its Action Programme relating to the 
Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers’ COM (89) 568 final.
25
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 13-15; Tuori (n 6) 26-27.
26
Bercusson (n 5) 335.
27
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 18-19; Thüsing (n 3) 6.
28
Thüsing (n 3) 6.
29
Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 22-23, 44; Tuori (n 6) 27.
30
That provision became a new Article 136 EC but is now in Article 151 TFEU.
7of Europe] signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights’. 
31
For the purpose of social policy the most significant development in the Nice Treaty of 2001 
was the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which contained in a single 
document, civil, political, economic and social rights based on, inter alia, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), the Community Social Charter from 1989 and the
Council of Europe’s Social Charter from 1961 (the ‘European Social Charter’), as well as the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
32
Few changes were made to the Employment Title by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The main 
legal basis of secondary legislation in the employment law field can now be found in Article 
153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
33
(‘TFEU’), which is a general 
rule for enacting employment legislation and enables an extensive harmonisation of national 
employment law. Other employment law related provisions in the TFEU include the rules on 
freedom of movement for workers (Articles 45-48 TFEU) and the principle of equal pay for 
men and women (Article 157 TFEU).
34
The general legislative bases for approximation of 
laws are Article 114 TFEU, for measures which have as their objective the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, requiring merely qualified majority voting, and Article 115 
TFEU, for measures which directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market, requiring unanimity in the Council.
As for the field of social policy more generally, the Lisbon Treaty made a significant impact 
by giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the Treaties. 
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty gave social policy a more prominent role in the values and 
objectives of the Union. According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union
35
(‘TEU’), 
which came in new with the Lisbon Treaty, the values of the Union are human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, non-discrimination, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, pluralism, tolerance, justice and solidarity. Article 3(3) TEU, also a new provision, 
emphasises the links between the economic and social objectives of the Treaty, stipulating 
that the Union shall ‘work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
                                                
31
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 23.
32
Barnard, EU Employment Law (n 29) 26.
33
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47.
34
Nielsen (n 11) 59; Thüsing (n 3) 8.
35
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13.
8full employment and social progress.’ Furthermore, a horizontal social clause was introduced 
in Article 9 TFEU requiring the Union to take into account ‘the promotion of a high level of 
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection […]’.
36
This overview of the development of European employment law and social policy 
demonstrates the circumstances in which the Transfer of Undertakings Directive was adopted 
and how the emphasis on social objectives and employees protection has increased steadily
since the 1970s.
2.2. The Aim of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive
Prior to the adoption of the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive in 1977, as a part of 
the Commission’s Social Action Programme, the number of mergers and acquisitions at 
European level had increased.
37
As stated in the Preamble to the Directive, ‘economic trends 
are bringing in their wake, at both national and Community level, changes in the structure of 
undertakings, through transfers of undertakings’.
38
In an explanatory memorandum attached 
to the proposal for the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the Commission stated:
Industrial development, both within individual Member States and at Community level, 
has resulted in a rapid increase in concentrations of undertakings. […]
Experience has shown that changes brought about in the structure of industrial 
undertakings as a result of concentrations have often had far-reaching consequences on 
the social situation of the workers employed by the undertakings concerned and that the 
legislation of the Member States applicable to such operations did not always take 
sufficient account of the interest of the workers. […]
These problems and the need to solve them at Community level have now been 
acknowledged.
39
The purpose of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive was, therefore, ‘to provide for the 
protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that 
their rights are safeguarded’, as stated in the Preamble to the Directive.
40
The Directive did
not govern the level and scope of national employment terms and conditions, but intended 
                                                
36
Barnard, EU Employment Law (n 29) 27.
37
Thüsing (n 3) 106.
38
Recital 1 in the Preamble to the original Directive.
39
Commission, ‘Proposal for Directive of the Council on harmonisation of the legislation of Member States on 
the retention of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations’ 
COM (74) 351 final/2, 1-2.
40
Recital 2 in the Preamble to the original Directive. See also the Commission’s explanatory memorandum, 
COM (74) 351 final/2 (n 39) 3.
9merely to ensure that the rights of employees which existed under national law prior to the 
transfer would continue to apply after the transfer. The protection under the Directive was, 
however, of fundamental importance in ensuring that employees did not lose the enjoyment of 
their employment rights as a result of the transfer of their employer’s business.
41
This aim of 
the Directive has been confirmed by the Court, which has stated that the purpose of the 
Directive is to ‘ensure, as far as possible, that the rights of employees are safeguarded in the 
event of a change of employer by enabling them to remain in employment with the new 
employer on the same terms and conditions as those agreed with the transferor’.
42
However, recitals 3 and 4 in the Preamble to the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive
indicate that the Directive also contained an economic aspect, i.e. the concerns that 
differences in employment protection between the Member States could have a direct effect 
on the functioning of the common market. This reflected a tension between the economic and 
social aims that characterised much of the Commission’s Social Action Programme, i.e. the 
tension between employment protection objectives, on the one hand, and the demands of 
business in a changing competitive environment and the importance of facilitating
restructuring and market integration, on the other.
43
This dual, economic and social, aim of the Directive is also evidenced by the fact that the 
legal basis of the Directive was Article 100 EEC, which allowed for approximation of 
provisions that directly affected the establishment or functioning of the common market, 
while the Preamble also referred to Article 117 EEC and the need to maintain the 
improvement of working conditions and standard of living for employees.
44
The Court has 
also confirmed the Directive’s dual aim, by stating that the intention of the legislature was 
‘both to ensure comparable protection for workers’ rights in the different Member States and 
to harmonize the costs which such protective rules entail for Community undertakings’.
45
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Síofra O‘Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice: Judicial Structures, Policies and 
Processes (Hart Publishing 2002) 242.
42
Case C-287/86 Ny Mølle Kro [1987] ECR 05465, para 12; Case C-324/86 Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] ECR 
00739, para 9; Joined Cases C-144/87 and C-145/87 Berg [1988] ECR 02559, para 12; Case C-362/89 D’Urso
[1991] ECR I-4105, para 9; Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas [1992] ECR I-06557, para 
21.
43
O‘Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice (n 41) 242-243; Hellsten, First Article (n 12) 19; 
ACL Davies, EU Labour Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 220.
44
Recital 5 in the Preamble to the original Directive. See also the Commission’s explanatory memorandum, 
COM (74) 351 final/2 (n 39) 2-3.
45
Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-02435, para 15. See also Commission, 
‘Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC’ COM (2007) 334 final, 2, where the aim of 
harmonisation by the Directive is held to be twofold, i.e. ‘to ensure comparable protection of employees’ rights 
in the Member States and to approximate the obligations which the rules of protection place on European 
undertakings’.
10
However, despite the fact that an economic aspect is, thus, inherent in the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive, the predominant aim of the Directive was, undeniably, protection of 
employees, as is clear from the Directive’s Preamble and Preparatory Documents.
46
The harmonisation sought by the Transfer of Undertakings Directive was only partial. As 
stated by the Court in Danmols Inventar,
47
the Directive was not intended to ‘establish a 
uniform level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common criteria’.
48
A 
wide discretion is, thus, left to the Member States and national courts when implementing and 
applying the Directive, and national law has a significant role to play, such as in defining key 
terms of the Directive.
49
Another aspect of the partial harmonisation nature of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive is that it only sets minimum standards, i.e. Member States are free to 
enact provisions and promote or permit collective agreements more favourable to 
employees.
50
2.3. The Amendments to the Transfer of Undertakings Directive
The original Transfer of Undertakings Directive from 1977 was amended by Directive 
98/50/EC on 29 June 1998, i.e. after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. In an explanatory 
memorandum attached to the first proposal for Directive 98/50/EC, the Commission stated: 
On a legislative level, the effectiveness of the Directive, in terms of the social protection 
it guarantees, cannot be denied. The Directive has proved to be an invaluable instrument 
for protecting employees in cases of corporate reorganization, ensuring peaceful and 
consensual economic and technological restructuring and laying down minimum 
standards for promoting fair competition with respect to such changes. It could, however, 
be argued that the Directive’s failure to provide for greater flexibility in the event of 
transfers of insolvent businesses or of undertakings facing major economic difficulties, as 
well as its failure to cover explicitly the transnational dimension of corporate 
                                                
46
See recitals 2 and 5 in the Preamble to the original Directive and the Commission’s explanatory memorandum, 
COM (74) 351 final/2 (n 39) 3. See also Jeremias Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU 
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restructuring, may have jeopardized or at least prejudiced the very objectives it was 
intended to achieve.
51
According to the Preamble to Directive 98/50/EC, its purpose was to amend the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive from 1977 in the light of the impact of the internal market, the 
legislative tendencies of the Member States with regard to the rescue of undertakings in 
economic difficulties and the case law of the Court.
52
The main amendments made to the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive by Directive 98/50/EC were clarifying certain terms of the 
Directive which had proved problematic, such as ‘undertaking’, ‘transfer’ and ‘employee’, 
permitting flexibility in insolvency procedures, strengthening the legal positions of 
employees’ representatives and putting stricter notification duties in place.
53
Directive 98/50/EC was adopted on the same legal basis as the previous Directive, i.e. Article 
100 EC. Interestingly, though, both the reference to the effect on the functioning of the 
common market and to Article 117 EEC and social upwards harmonisation in the Preamble to 
the previous Directive were missing from the Preamble to Directive 98/50/EC. Literally 
speaking, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive was, therefore, left without a formal tie to 
the social chapter in the Treaty.
54
However, the Preamble to Directive 98/50/EC did refer to 
the Community Social Charter from 1989, in particular provisions that stated that ‘the 
completion of the internal market must lead to an improvement in the living and working 
conditions of workers in the European Community’.
55
In October 2001, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive from 1977, as amended by Directive
98/50/EC, was repealed and consolidated through the current Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive (Directive 2001/23/EC),
56
which was adopted ‘in the interest of clarity and 
rationality’ but did not materially change the previous Directive.
57
The current Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive was adopted on the same legislative basis, i.e. Article 94 EC 
[previously Article 100 EEC], the reference to Article 117 EC and social upwards 
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53
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Hellsten, First Article (n 12) 37-38.
55
Recital 1 in the Preamble to Directive 98/50/EC.
56
Hereinafter, references to the ‘Transfer of Undertakings Directive’ will refer to this, current, Directive 
(2001/23/EC) and references will be made to the Articles as they appear in this Directive.
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See recital 1 in the Preamble to the current Transfer of Undertakings Directive. 
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harmonisation was still missing from the Preamble, but the reference to the Community 
Social Charter remained the same as in the Preamble to Directive 98/50/EC.
58
2.4. The Structure and Main Provisions of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive
The Transfer of Undertakings Directive applies, according to Article 1(1)(a), where an 
undertaking or business (or part thereof) is transferred to another employer ‘as a result of a 
legal transfer or merger’. Article 1(2) provides that the Directive shall apply where and in so 
far as the undertaking or business (or part thereof) to be transferred is situated within the 
territorial scope of the Treaty. Consequently, the scope of the Directive covers both cross-
border and national transfers.
The Transfer of Undertakings Directive establishes essentially a three pillar protection for 
employees. Firstly, it provides, in Article 3, for the automatic transfer of the employment 
relationship, with all its rights and obligations, from the transferor
59
to the transferee
60
, by 
virtue of a transfer of the undertaking to another employer. This protection covers both rights 
arising from individual contracts of employment (Article 3(1)) and rights under collective 
agreements (Article 3(3)). According to Article 2(1)(d) of the Directive, the term 
‘employment relationship’ is based on the national definition of employee, but Article 2(2) 
prevents part-time workers, fixed-term workers and temporary workers from being excluded. 
Secondly, Article 4 of the Directive protects employees against dismissal by the transferor or 
transferee, subject to the employer’s right to dismiss employees for economic, technical or 
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce. Thirdly, the transferor and the 
transferee are required, under Article 7, to inform and consult the representatives of the 
employees affected by the transfer.
61
As already mentioned, the level of protection guaranteed by the Directive is minimum 
protection, since Member States are free to apply laws, regulations, administrative provisions 
or collective agreements which are more favourable to employees, as confirmed by Article 8 
of the Directive.
62
                                                
58
Recital 5 in the Preamble to the current Transfer of Undertakings Directive. 
59
A ‘transferor’ is defined in Article 2(1)(a) of the Directive as ‘any natural or legal persons who, by reason of a 
transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), ceases to be the employer in respect of the undertaking, business or 
part of the undertaking or business’.
60
Article 2(1)(b) defines ‘transferee’ as ‘any natural or legal persons who, by reason of a transfer within the 
meaning of Article 1(1), becomes the employer in respect of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking 
or business’.
61
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 621-622; Thüsing (n 3) 119.
62
Barnard, EC Employment Law (n 5) 622.
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It should be noted that Article 3, which is the elementary provision of this Directive,
63
has 
remained largely unchanged since the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive, apart from
paragraph 2 of the Article, which came in new with the amending Directive 98/50/EC and 
allows Member States to adopt measures to ensure that the transferor notifies the transferee of 
all the rights and obligations which will be transferred to the transferee. By the amending 
Directive 98/50/EC, Article 3(2) on rights under collective agreements, hence, became Article 
3(3) and the last sub-paragraph of Article 3, which excludes from the scope of the Directive 
certain benefits arising under supplementary company pension schemes, became Article 3(4), 
instead of Article 3(3) before. 
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See e.g. Hellsten, First Article (n 12) 18.
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3. THE SAFEGUARDING OF EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS ARISING FROM 
INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT – ARTICLE 3(1)
The Transfer of Undertakings Directive is one of the most disputed directives in the field of 
Union social policy, with an extensive case law from the Court of Justice.
64
The EFTA Court 
has also delivered several judgments on the interpretation of the Directive.
65
A vast part of the
case law of the Court of Justice on the Directive has concerned problems of interpretation in 
relation to the notion of a ‘transfer of an undertaking’ and the nature of the contractual 
relations giving rise to a transfer. However, the case law on employees’ rights under Article 3 
is also extensive.
66
Due to the close links between Article 3(1) on rights stemming from individual contracts of 
employment and Article 3(3) on rights stemming from collective agreements, it is appropriate 
to take a look at the case law of the Court concerning Article 3(1) of the Directive, and the 
protection afforded to employees more generally, before going into more details on the case 
law on Article 3(3) of the Directive.
Article 3(1) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive states:
The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an 
employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such 
transfer, be transferred to the transferee.
Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer, the transferor and the 
transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of obligations which arose before 
the date of transfer from a contract of employment or an employment relationship 
existing on the date of the transfer.
The explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission’s proposal for the original 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive from 1977 stipulates, regarding Article 3:
This provision, which requires the automatic transfer of employment relationships to the 
transferee, is the core of the proposed Directive. It is designed to prevent the transferee 
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Justice (Hart Publishing 2001) 150; Barrett (n 64) 1053-1054.
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from refusing, on the basis of civil law provisions governing transfers, to retain the 
workers in employment or from concluding an agreement with the transferor to exclude 
employment relationships from the transfer. In the latter case, the transferor would have 
no alternative but to give notice to workers affected by such exclusion. Such an outcome 
would be in conflict with the aims of protection for workers.
67
In D’Urso,
68
the Court established that the contracts of employment or employment 
relationships existing on the date of transfer of an undertaking between the transferor and the
employees may not be maintained with the transferor and are automatically transferred to the 
transferee by the mere fact of the transfer.
69
This is due to the mandatory nature of the 
Directive and entails that the transfer of the contracts of employment may not be made subject 
to the intention of the transferor or the transferee, nor the consent of the employees. The 
transferor is, thus, released from his obligations as an employer by reason of the transfer and 
the transferee may not obstruct the transfer by refusing to fulfil his obligations.
70
The Member 
States can, however, provide for joint liability for both the transferor and transferee after the 
date of the transfer in respect of obligations which arose before the transfer from a contract of 
employment existing on the date of transfer.
71
Some Member States have adopted some form 
of joint-liability rule which entails that the transferor continues to be liable for pre-transfer 
debts with the transferee.
72
Although the transfer of the employment relationships is automatic and, thus, not subject to 
the consent of the employees, the employees can refuse to have their employment contracts 
transferred to the transferee. In Danmols Inventar,
73
the Court had held that ‘the protection 
which the directive is intended to guarantee is redundant where the person concerned decides 
of his own accord not to continue the employment relationship with the new employer after 
the transfer’ and that in such situations Article 3(1) of the Directive would not apply.
74
In 
Katsikas,
75
the Court stated that the Directive does not oblige the employees to continue their 
employment relationship with the transferee as such an obligation would jeopardise the 
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fundamental rights of employees to freely choose their employer.
76
However, if the 
employees voluntarily decide not to transfer, it is for the Member States to determine the fate 
of the contracts of employment or employment relationships, i.e. whether they are regarded as 
terminated either by the employees or by the employer or whether they are maintained with 
the transferor.
77
Another aspect of the mandatory nature of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive is that 
employees cannot waive the rights conferred upon them by the Directive.
78
In Daddy’s Dance 
Hall,
79
the Court held:
Since this protection [of employees’ rights] is a matter of public policy, and therefore 
independent of the will of the parties to the contract of employment, the rules of the 
directive, in particular those concerning the protection of workers against dismissal by 
reason of the transfer, must be considered to be mandatory, so that it is not possible to 
derogate from them in a manner unfavourable to employees.
It follows that employees are not entitled to waive the rights conferred on them by the 
directive and that those rights cannot be restricted even with their consent.
80
This non-entitlement to waive employees’ rights applies even if the disadvantages resulting 
from a waiver of rights are offset by new benefits in such a way that the employee is not 
placed overall in a less favourable situation than before.
81
Provided that the minimum 
standards of the Directive are met, however, the level of employees’ protection may be 
increased. This is also in line with the rule in Article 8 of the Directive, which provides that 
Member States are allowed to apply or introduce rules which are more favourable to 
employees.
82
The fact that the level of employees’ protection cannot be curtailed entails that the transferee 
may not alter the terms and conditions of the employees’ rights in connection with the 
transfer.
83
However, since the Directive is only intended to achieve partial harmonisation, it
merely ensures that employees are protected in their relations with the transferee to the same 
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extent as they were in their relations with the transferor under national law.
84
Consequently, 
the transferee is free to alter the employment relationships in a manner unfavourable to 
employees, to the same extent as national law would have enabled the transferor to do so, 
provided that ‘the transfer of undertaking itself may never constitute the reason for that 
amendment’.
85
The transferee is, thus, prevented from bringing the transferred employees’ 
terms and conditions into line with those of existing employees when the transfer takes place, 
although it remains unclear how long the transferee would have to wait. Generally, this test of 
when the transfer constitutes the reason for the amendments is not clear-cut.
86
It should be 
noted that it follows from the judgment in Delahaye
87
that the public sector seems to benefit
from an exception to this rule.
88
Among other issues that have been dealt with by the Court concerning Article 3(1) of the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive is what kind of rights and obligations shall be transferred.  
The phrase ‘transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from 
an employment relationship’ in Article 3(1) has been interpreted broadly by the Court, to 
encompass, inter alia, rights contingent upon dismissal and the grant of early retirement by 
agreement with the employer.
89
The other side of that coin is that the Court has held that
Article 3(4) of the Directive, which excludes from the scope of the Directive certain benefits 
arising under supplementary company pension schemes, is to be interpreted strictly. The 
exception in Article 3(4) only applies to the benefits listed exhaustively in that provision and
they must be construed in a narrow sense.
90
The Court has also stated that the transfer of the 
contracts of employment and employment relationships takes place on the date of the transfer 
of the undertaking and that only rights and obligations of employees whose contracts of 
employment or employment relationships are in force on the date of the transfer are covered
by Article 3(1).
91
Furthermore, the Court has held that in calculating employees’ rights of a 
financial nature, such as termination payment or salary increases, the transferee must take into 
account the employees’ entire length of service.
92
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4. THE SAFEGUARDING OF EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS ARISING FROM 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS – ARTICLE 3(3)
4.1. Generally on Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive
Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive stipulates:
Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions 
agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms as applicable to the transferor under 
that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the 
entry into force or application of another collective agreement.
Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions with the 
proviso that it shall not be less than one year.
The explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission’s proposal for the original 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive from 1977 states that it would be a breach of the right of 
free association to impose on the transferee a collective agreement to which he is not already 
party and which has not been declared generally binding. The explanatory memorandum 
further provides: 
However, in order to prevent the workers losing their terms of employment reached 
through collective agreements, paragraph 3 attempts to provide a compromise: although 
the status of a party to any collective agreement is not imposed on the transferee, he shall 
respect existing terms of employment reached through collective agreements and shall, in 
the case of collective bargaining agreements of limited duration, respect the terms of 
employment laid down in the collective agreement up to the end of its period of validity 
and, in the case of collective bargaining agreements of unlimited duration, for a period of 
one year.
93
Although this statement from the Commission is not fully in line with the final text of Article 
3 as adopted in the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive, since quite substantial 
changes were made to the provision during the legislative process, it reveals that Article 3(3) 
of the Directive provides a compromise and balances the protection afforded to the employees 
with the interests of the transferees.
94
That balance is achieved by requiring the transferee to 
respect the terms agreed in existing collective agreements, despite the fact that the transferee 
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is not a party to that collective agreement and although the transferee is unwilling or unable to 
take part or be represented in the bargaining forum.
95
That balance is also achieved by 
confining the transferee’s obligation to the period until the collective agreement terminates, 
expires or is replaced by another collective agreement. Furthermore, Member States are 
permitted to limit the period for observing terms and conditions in collective agreements, 
provided that the period shall not be less than one year.
96
Before examining the Court’s case law on Article 3(3) of the Directive it is necessary to 
address, shortly, the differences in the definition of collective agreements in the Member 
States.
4.2. Different Rules on Collective Agreements in the Member States
Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive concerns employees’ rights under
collective agreements. The definition of collective agreements is, however, left to the national 
legislation of the Member States, as a European definition of collective agreements does not 
exist.
97
The understanding of the term ‘collective agreement’ varies between the Member States. 
There are big differences regarding, inter alia, the legal regulation of collective agreements 
with regard to negotiating rights and duties, levels of collective bargaining and the binding 
effect of collective agreements. The main difference is between continental European 
collective agreements, on the one hand, and English collective agreements, on the other, 
concerning the mandatory normative effect of collective agreements. English collective 
agreements have no mandatory normative effect but only obtain legal effect as an implied 
term in the individual contract of employment. Furthermore, English collective agreements 
are not binding as contracts and, hence, have no obligatory or contractual effect. They can be 
derogated from to the detriment of the employee by express terms in the individual 
employment contract. Consequently, individual contracts of employment are the basis of the 
employment and take precedence over collective agreements under English law.
98
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The general pattern in the continental European countries is that collective agreements are 
binding as contracts and have mandatory normative effect. They cannot be derogated from to 
the detriment of the employee by individual contracts of employment or unilateral decisions 
by the employer. Collective agreements are, thus, ranked higher than individual employment 
contracts. There are, however, differences between the continental countries in the detailed 
application of these principles.
99
As a result of these different rules on collective agreements, the effect of Article 3(3) of the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive varies according to the understanding of collective 
agreements in each Member State. 
4.3. Case law of the Court on Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive
Since the adoption of the original Transfer of Undertakings Directive in 1977, the Court has 
dealt with Article 3(3) of the Directive and the issue of collective agreements in eight 
judgments, which will be summarised in the following chapters. 
4.3.1. The Personal Scope of the Protection
The issue of which employees benefit from the protection provided in Article 3(3) of the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive was dealt with in the Court’s first judgment on Article 
3(3). The case of Ny Mølle Kro
100
concerned Mrs Hansen who worked as a waitress in a 
tavern in Denmark, Ny Mølle Kro, during the summer season of 1983. Before that time, in 
January 1981, the operation of the tavern had been taken over by Mrs Hannibalsen. The 
previous employer, Mrs Larsen, had concluded an agreement with the Association of Hotel 
and Restaurant Employees according to which Mrs Larsen was to comply with the terms of 
any collective agreement concluded by that association. Mrs Hansen claimed that the 
remuneration paid to her by Mrs Hannibalsen was lower than the minimum amount to be paid 
under the collective agreement with which Mrs Larsen had agreed to comply.
101
The Court was asked, inter alia, whether Article 3(3)
102
of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive must be interpreted as obliging the transferee to continue to observe the terms and 
conditions agreed in any collective agreement in respect of workers who were not employed 
by the undertaking at the time of its transfer. The Court stated that it followed from the 
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purpose and scheme of the Directive that Article 3(3) was ‘intended to ensure the continued 
observance by the transferee of the terms and conditions of employment agreed in a collective 
agreement only in respect of workers who were already employed by the undertaking at the 
date of the transfer, and not as regards persons who were engaged after that date.’
103
The 
Court’s answer was, therefore, that Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 
‘does not oblige the transferee to continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in a 
collective agreement in respect of workers who were not employed by the undertaking at the 
time of the transfer.’
104
It follows from this judgment, that the transferee does not need to extend the collectively 
agreed working conditions to employees recruited after the transfer. 
4.3.2. The Temporal Scope of the Protection
As mentioned above, Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive obliges the 
transferee to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement binding on 
the transferor ‘until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry 
into force or application of another collective agreement’.
105
Accordingly, the protection 
afforded to employees under Article 3(3) is subject to time limitations.
This issue was dealt with in Juuri,
106
a case of 27 November 2008. The facts were that Ms 
Juuri worked from 5 April 1994 as an employee in the staff canteen in Hämeenlinna. The 
metal industry collective agreement applied to Ms Juuri’s employment relationship but on the 
last day of validity of that collective agreement, i.e. 31 January 2003, the canteen undertaking 
in Hämeenlinna was transferred from Rautaruukki to Amica. Amica informed Ms Juuri that as 
of 1 February 2003 the collective agreement for the accommodation and catering sector, 
binding on Amica, would apply to her employment. Ms Juuri insisted that the metal industry’s
collective agreement should continue to apply to her. When Amica did not agree to that, Ms 
Juuri terminated her contract of employment. Ms Juuri brought an action before the Helsinki 
District Court arguing that her working conditions had become substantially worse as a result 
of the transfer of the undertaking.
107
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A part of the first question referred to the Court concerned Article 3(3) of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive and the implications of the fact that the transferee observed the 
collective agreement, which was binding on the transferor and guaranteed better working 
conditions for employees, only until the date of its expiry, the result of which was 
deterioration in working conditions, according to the employee.
108
The Court referred to 
Article 3(3) of the Directive and stated:
Thus that provision aims to ensure that, despite the transfer of the undertaking, all the 
working conditions continue to be observed in accordance with the intention of the 
contracting parties to the collective agreement. However, that provision cannot derogate 
from the intention of those parties as expressed in the collective agreement. Accordingly, 
if the contracting parties have agreed not to guarantee certain working conditions beyond 
a particular date, Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23 cannot impose on the transferee the 
obligation to observe those working conditions after the agreed date of expiry of the 
collective agreement, as after that date the agreement is no longer in force.
It follows that Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23 does not require the transferee to ensure 
that the working conditions agreed with the transferor are observed after the date of 
expiry of the collective agreement, even though that date coincides with the date on 
which the undertaking was transferred.
109
The Court concluded that it was for the referring court to assess the situation at issue in the 
light of this interpretation of Article 3(3).
110
This judgment confirms that the minimum protection afforded to employees under Article 
3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive is confined to the duration of the collective 
agreement in force at the time of the transfer of the undertaking.
111
This same conclusion can
be found in other judgments by the Court, such as Rask and Christensen,
112
Martin,
113
Werhof
114
and Scattolon.
115
In Scattolon, a case of 6 September 2011, the situation was particular due to the fact that the 
collective agreement in force at the time of the transfer binding on the transferor did not 
terminate or expire by reason of a clause in that collective agreement providing for the 
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termination or expiry, but by reason of national legislation which provided for the 
replacement of that collective agreement with another collective agreement binding on the 
transferee.
Ms Scattolon had been employed by the municipality of Scorzè since 16 May 1980 as a 
cleaner in State schools. She worked as a member of the administrative, technical and 
auxiliary (‘ATA’) staff of the local authority and was paid on the basis of the collective 
agreement for the regions and local authorities sector (the CCNL for local authority 
employees). Pursuant to Italian legislation and its implementing measures, the local authority 
ATA staff was transferred, as of 1 January 2000, to the services of the State in such a way that 
the application of the CCNL for local authority employees was replaced by that of the 
collective agreement in force with the transferee, namely the CCNL for schools. Ms Scattolon 
was transferred onto the list of State ATA employees and placed on a salary scale 
corresponding to nine years of service. She subsequently brought an action seeking 
recognition of the whole of the length of her service.
116
The second and third questions from the referring court, which the Court examined together, 
concerned whether Article 3 of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive must be interpreted as 
meaning that, in order to calculate the remuneration of workers who have been subject to a 
transfer, the transferee must take account of the length of the service completed by those 
workers with the transferor.
117
The Court stated that the working conditions in the collective agreement in force at the time 
of the transfer can cease to be applicable, even immediately on the date of the transfer. This 
would apply when one of the situations referred to in the first sub-paragraph of Article 3(3) 
are present, i.e. the termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or 
application of another collective agreement. The Court, thus, held that it was permissible for 
the transferee to apply, from the date of the transfer, the working conditions laid down by the 
collective agreement in force with the transferee. The arrangements chosen for salary 
integration must, however, be in conformity with the aim of the directive to prevent 
employees from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. 
The Court, hence, stated that the replacement of the conditions which the employees enjoy 
under the collective agreement with the transferor with those laid down by the collective 
agreement in force with the transferee cannot have the aim or effect of imposing on the 
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employees conditions which are, overall, less favourable than those applicable before the 
transfer. The achievement of the objective of the Directive could then easily be called into 
question in any sector governed by collective agreement.
118
The Court then concluded:
In the light of the above, the answer to the second and third questions is that, where a 
transfer within the meaning of Directive 77/187 leads to the immediate application to the 
transferred workers of the collective agreement in force with the transferee, and where the 
conditions for remuneration are linked in particular to length of service, Article 3 of that 
directive precludes the transferred workers from suffering, in comparison with their 
situation immediately before the transfer, a substantial loss of salary by reason of the fact 
that their length of service with the transferor, equivalent to that completed by workers in 
the service of the transferee, is not taken into account when determining their starting 
salary position with the latter. It is for the national court to examine whether, at the time 
of the transfer at issue in the main proceedings, there was such a loss of salary.
119
This judgment must be understood in such a way that a collective agreement in force at the 
time of the transfer of an undertaking can ‘terminate’ or ‘expire’, within the meaning of the 
first sub-paragraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive, by national legislation or its implementing 
measures which provide for the replacement of that collective agreement by another collective 
agreement binding on the transferee. However, in order to prevent the protection under Article 
3(3) from being circumvented, such replacement of collective agreements can only take place 
if the employees are not placed, overall, in a position which is less favourable than the one
immediately before the transfer.
120
In circumstances such as the one in this case, the 
protection under Article 3(3) of the Directive, thus, goes beyond the time limitations in the 
provision, since the transferee must still comply with the aim of the Directive, even though 
the transferor’s collective agreement has terminated or expired.
4.3.3. The Types of Employees’ Rights Covered by the Protection
In the case of Beckmann, the question arose whether the obligations arising on dismissal of an 
employee from a contract of employment, an employment relationship or a collective 
agreement binding the transferor are transferred to the transferee, even if those obligations 
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derive from or are implemented by statutory instruments.
121
This case concerned Mrs 
Beckmann who worked within the English National Health Service (‘NHS’) under the 
General Whitley Council conditions of service (‘GWC conditions of service’), which were 
established through joint negotiations between employers and employees in the public sector. 
On 1 June 1995, the body for which Mrs Beckmann worked was transferred to Dynamco 
Whicheloe Macfarlane Ltd (‘DWM’) for whom Mrs Beckmann worked until 6 May 1997 
when she was dismissed for redundancy. Mrs Beckmann claimed she was entitled to benefits 
under a section of the GWC conditions which set out the term of a collective agreement.
122
In a judgment of 4 June 2002, the Court, having established that the benefits in question did 
not fall within the scope of the exception in Article 3(4) of the Directive relating to old-age, 
invalidity or survivor’s benefits,
123
went on the state that Articles 3(1) and 3(3) relate to all 
rights of employees mentioned therein which are not covered by Article 3(4).
124
The Court 
concluded that ‘the obligations applicable in the event of the dismissal of an employee, arising 
from a contract of employment, an employment relationship or a collective agreement binding 
the transferor as regards that employee, are transferred to the transferee […], regardless of the 
fact that those obligations derive from statutory instruments or are implemented by such 
instruments and regardless of the practical arrangements adopted for such implementation.’
125
It was, however, for the referring court to determine, if necessary, whether the benefits at 
issue arose from Mrs Beckmann’s contract of employment or employment relationship with 
the transferor or from a collective agreement which would bind the transferee.
126
The conclusion that can be drawn from this judgment is that all employees’ rights arising
from collective agreements, which are not covered by the exception in Article 3(4) of the 
Directive, are transferred to the transferee, including those that stem from statutory 
instruments.
4.3.4. The Possibility for the Transferee to Amend the Terms and Conditions Arising from 
Collective Agreements
The Court has been asked to clarify whether and to what extent the transferee is allowed to 
amend the terms and conditions of the employment arising from collective agreements. 
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The case of Rask and Christensen, of 12 November 1992, concerned the issue of whether the 
transferee is allowed to make changes to the time and composition of the payment of salaries 
to the employees. The plaintiffs in the main proceedings, Rask and Christensen, were 
employed by Philips in Denmark in one of its four canteens and, as from 1 January 1989, by 
ISS, which took over the management of the four canteens on that date. Proceedings between 
the plaintiffs and ISS arose out of changes made unilaterally by ISS in the day on which the 
wages were paid and in items going to make up those employees’ wages.
127
One of the questions asked to the Court was whether it was incompatible with Article 3(3)
128
of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive to alter the time when wages are paid to the 
employees and/or to alter the composition of the employees’ wages if it is otherwise provided 
that the total amount of the wages remains unchanged.
129
The Court reformulated this 
question as to concern Article 3 of the Directive as a whole, and not only Article 3(3).
With reference to Daddy’s Dance Hall
130
the Court held that, under Article 3(1), the terms 
and conditions of the contract of employment or employment relationship relating to wages 
can be altered by the transferee, in so far as the applicable national law allows such alterations 
to be made in situations other than the transfer of an undertaking. Such amendments are, 
however, precluded if made by reason of the transfer, even if the total amount of wages 
remains the same, i.e. even if the overall situation is not unfavourable for the employee.
131
The Court then added that, under Article 3(3) of the Directive, ‘the transferee is also bound to 
continue to observe the terms and conditions of employment agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date 
of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of 
another collective agreement’.
132
It is, however, for the national court to assess, the extent, 
under national law, of the transferor’s obligations, whether they arise under a contract of 
employment, an employment relationship or a collective agreement.
133
The part of the Court’s reasoning in this judgment that concerns Article 3(3) of the Directive 
is neither detailed nor clear, but this case should be read in conjunction with the case of 
Martin, a case of 6 November 2003, which sheds brighter light on the possibility for the 
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transferee to change the terms and conditions arising from collective agreements under Article 
3(3) of the Directive. 
In Martin, a nursing college was transferred from the English NHS to South Bank University 
(‘SBU’). The employees in question had enjoyed the benefits of the GWC conditions of 
service, including those relating to early retirement, as was stated in their employment 
contracts. SBU sought to change the terms of the retirement scheme in order to bring them 
into line with the terms offered to its other employees.
134
By its fourth question the referring court asked whether an employee may agree to forego 
entitlements to early payment of pension and retirement lump sum and/or the annual 
allowance and lump sum compensation, even though the terms of early retirement offered by 
the transferee do not provide the same benefits and that employee became a member of the 
transferee’s retirement scheme upon the transfer of the undertaking.
135
The Court began by confirming its previous rulings concerning the possibility of the 
transferee to change the employment relationships in a manner unfavourable to employees,
136
but then found that in this case the alteration of the early retirement terms was connected to 
the transfer and any consent given by employees to such an alteration was, therefore invalid in 
principle.
137
It then went on to state that the referring court would need to assess the effect of 
the particular circumstance that the relevant section of the GWC conditions of service was the 
product of a collective agreement.
138
The Court noted the fact that Article 3(3) merely 
requires the transferee to observe the terms and conditions in collective agreements for a 
certain period of time,
139
and then concluded:
Therefore, the answer to the Employment Tribunal’s fourth question must be that Article 
3 of the directive precludes the transferee from offering the employees of a transferred 
entity terms less favourable than those offered to them by the transferor in respect of early 
retirement, and those employees from accepting those terms, where those terms are 
merely brought into line with the terms offered to the transferee’s other employees at the 
time of the transfer, unless the more favourable terms previously offered by the transferor 
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arose from a collective agreement which is no longer legally binding on the employees of 
the entity transferred, having regard to the conditions set out in [Article 3(3)].
140
This judgment must be understood as meaning that the possibility for the transferee to change
the terms and conditions of the employment relationship are the same under Article 3(3) as 
under Article 3(1) of the Directive,
141
during the period in which the transferee is bound by 
the collective agreement in force at the time of the transfer. After the expiry of that period, the 
employees lose their rights under Article 3(3) and the transferee can amend the terms and 
conditions of the employees’ rights that derive from collective agreements.
142
In this context, the case of Scattolon, is also worth mentioning. As discussed above, the Court 
found in that case that the collective agreement of the transferor could be replaced by the 
collective agreement of the transferee upon transfer by national legislation, as long as such 
replacement does not have ‘the aim or effect of imposing on those workers conditions which 
are, overall, less favourable than those applicable before the transfer’. Rather than being seen 
as amending the rule that no contractual variations are possible in connection with the 
transfer, irrespective of whether the amendments lead to a more favourable overall position 
for the employees, this judgment must be understood as dealing more with the temporal scope 
of the protection in Article 3(3) of the Directive. As noted above, the transferee is in principle 
free to alter the terms and conditions of the employment relationship as he wishes when the 
protection under Article 3(3) has terminated or expired. Scattolon must be seen as providing 
for an exception to that rule, since the transferee must still, in the circumstances such as the 
one in that case, comply with the aim of the Directive and not provide, overall, less favourable 
conditions.
4.3.5. Static versus Dynamic Incorporation Clauses
Two of the Court’s cases dealt with the question whether clauses in contracts of employment 
referring to collective agreements can be given a dynamic interpretation, as comprising also 
future collective agreements, or whether the interpretation must be static, meaning that the 
transferee cannot be bound by future collective agreements. The circumstances of those cases 
and the questions asked by the referring courts were, however, different among the two cases. 
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In Werhof, a judgment of 9 March 2006, the claimant in the main proceedings, Mr Werhof, 
was employed by DUEWAG AG on 1 April 1985. According to his contract of employment, 
the employment relationship was to be governed by a collective agreement concluded 
between the North Rhine-Westphalia Metal and Electrical Industry Federation (‘AGV’) and 
the Trade Union for the Metal Industry (‘IG Metall’), but DUEWAG AG was a member of 
the AGV. On 1 October 1999 the part of the business in which the claimant was employed 
was transferred to the defendant in the main proceedings, Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & 
Co. KG. The defendant was not a member of any employers’ association which concluded
collective agreements. IG Metall and AGV concluded a new collective agreement on 23 May 
2002 on which the claimant based his claim for an increase in the wage rate and an additional 
payment.
143
By its first question, the referring court asked, essentially, whether Article 3(1) of the Transfer 
of Undertakings Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking is 
transferred and a contract of employment refers to a collective agreement to which the 
transferor is a party but not the transferee, the transferee is not bound by collective agreement 
subsequent to the one in force at the time of that transfer.
144
The Court began by noting that under the Directive employees enjoy special protection, on 
transfer of an undertaking, designed to prevent the erosion which could result from an 
unconditional application of the principle of freedom of contract.
145
According to the Court, 
the clause in the claimant’s contract of employment that referred to a collective agreement
was covered by Article 3(1) of the Directive and, consequently, the rights and obligations 
arising from that collective agreement were automatically transferred to the transferee, even if 
he was not a party to any collective agreement. The Court further stated that, since a clause 
referring to a collective agreement cannot have a wider scope than the agreement to which is 
refers, account also had to be taken of Article 3(3) of the Directive, which contains limitations 
to the principle that the collective agreement referred to by the contract of employment is 
applicable.
146
The Court held that the wording of Article 3(3) of the Directive does not in any way indicate 
that the Union legislature intended for the transferee to be bound by collective agreements 
other than the one in force at the time of the transfer, as the objective of the Directive is
                                                
143
Werhof (n 114) paras 6-12.
144
ibid, para 17. 
145
ibid, paras 23-24.
146
ibid, paras 27-28.
30
merely to safeguard the rights and obligations of employees in force on the day of the transfer. 
The Court then added that ‘although in accordance with the objective of the Directive the 
interests of the employees concerned by the transfer must be protected, those of the transferee, 
who must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on his 
operations, cannot be disregarded.’
147
With reference to the fundamental right not to join an 
association, protected under Article 11 ECHR and in the Union legal order, the Court found 
that it could not be maintained that a contractual clause referring to a collective agreement 
must necessarily be dynamic, in the meaning that future collective agreements would apply to 
a transferee who is not party to the collective agreements.
148
The Court’s answer to the first 
question was, thus, that:
Article 3(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as not precluding, in a situation where 
the contract of employment refers to a collective agreement binding the transferor, that 
the transferee, who is not party to such an agreement, is not bound by collective 
agreements subsequent to the one which was in force at the time of the transfer of the 
business.
149
This judgment entails that a static interpretation of a contractual clause that refers to a 
collective agreement, meaning that the transferee is not bound by future collective 
agreements, is not precluded by the Directive.
150
That does not say anything about whether 
such static interpretation is required and a dynamic interpretation precluded by the Directive 
in all circumstances.
151
It is also worth noting that although the question from the referring 
court, and consequently also the answer by the Court, concern interpretation of Article 3(1) of 
the Directive, that interpretation is also affected by Article 3(3) of the Directive and the matter 
is highly relevant in relation to the issue of collective agreements.
In the recent judgment of Mark Alemo-Herron,
152
of 18 July 2013, the Court was faced with
the issue of whether dynamic clauses incorporating future collective agreements are 
allowed,
153
which represent the other side of the coin from the issue dealt with in Werhof. The 
facts of Mark Alemo-Herron were that Mark Alemo-Herron and his colleagues were 
employees in the leisure department of Lewisham London Borough Council (‘Lewisham’)
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and benefitted from the terms and conditions negotiated by the NJC, the local government 
collective bargaining body. In accordance with UK rules on collective agreement, the 
agreements negotiated by the NJC were not binding as a matter of law but as a result of a 
contractual term contained in the relevant contracts of employment, which provided that the 
employees’ terms and conditions would be ‘in accordance with collective agreements 
negotiated from time to time by the [NJC] […]’. In 2002, Lewisham contracted out its leisure 
services to a private sector undertaking, CCL Limited. At that time the NJC agreement from 1 
April 2002 to 31 March 2004 applied. In May 2004, the leisure department activities were 
transferred to Parkwood Leisure Ltd. Being also a private sector undertaking, Parkwood did 
not and could not participate in the NJC. In June 2004 the NJC reached a new agreement, with 
retrospective effect from 1 April 2004, which was to continue in force until 31 March 2007. 
Parkwood refused to grant the employees the pay increase agreed within the NJC for the 
period from April 2004 to March 2007, concluding that the new agreement was not binding 
on it.
154
Noting that under domestic contract law the transferee could be bound also by subsequent 
collective agreements, the referring court asked the Court three questions, which were 
examined together, concerning the issue whether Article 3 of the Directive must be 
interpreted as precluding a Member State from providing that dynamic clauses referring to 
collective agreements negotiated and agreed after the date of transfer are enforceable against 
the transferee.
155
The Court referred to its conclusion in Werhof and then to Article 8 of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive, which allows for national law or collective agreements that are more 
favourable to employees. It was undisputed that the clauses in the employment contracts of 
Mark Alemo-Herron and his colleagues that referred to collective agreements negotiated and 
agreed after the date of the transfer, providing dynamic contractual rights, were more 
favourable to the employees.
156
The Court then stated:
However, Directive 77/187 does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of employees in 
the event of transfer of an undertaking, but seeks to ensure a fair balance between the 
interests of those employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, on the other. 
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More particularly, it makes clear that the transferee must be in a position to make the 
adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations.
157
The Court found that a dynamic clause referring to future collective agreements that were 
intended to regulate working conditions in the public sector would be liable to limit 
considerably the room for manoeuvre necessary for a private transferee to make necessary 
adjustments and changes following a transfer from the public to the private sector and would, 
thus, be liable to undermine the fair balance between the interests of the transferee and the 
employees.
158
The Court furthermore stated that the provisions of the Directive must be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular Article 16, which 
lays down the freedom to conduct a business. According to the Court, the freedom to conduct 
a business covers, inter alia, the freedom of contracts and entails that ‘the transferee must be 
able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to 
negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a 
view to its future economic activity’. The Court held that since the transferee in this case was
unable to do so, the transferee’s contractual freedom was seriously reduced to the point that 
such a limitation was liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a 
business.
159
The answer provided by the Court was, thus:
Having regard to all the foregoing, the answer to the three questions referred is that 
Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from 
providing, in the event of a transfer of an undertaking, that dynamic clauses referring to 
collective agreements negotiated and adopted after the date of transfer are enforceable 
against the transferee, where that transferee does not have the possibility of participating 
in the negotiation process of such collective agreements concluded after the date of 
transfer.
160
It follows from this judgment that dynamic incorporation clauses are precluded, despite being 
more favourable to employees, if the transferee is unable to participate in the negotiation 
process of the future collective agreements. The conclusions to be drawn from Werhof and 
Mark Alemo-Herron are, therefore, that static incorporation clauses are not precluded by 
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Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, whereas dynamic incorporation 
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5. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 3(3)
5.1. The Main Conclusions of the Case law
The main conclusions of the Court’s case law on Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive can be summed up as follows. The personal scope of the protection afforded to 
employees under Article 3(3) only covers workers who were employed by the undertaking in 
question at the time of the transfer.
161
The temporal scope of the protection in Article 3(3) is 
confined to the duration of the collective agreement in force at the time of the transfer of the 
undertaking, i.e. ‘until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the 
entry into force or application of another collective agreement’.
162
However, if the termination 
or replacement of the collective agreement takes place by reason of national legislation, such 
replacement can only take place if the employees are not placed, overall, in a position which 
is unfavourable compared with the situation immediately before the transfer.
163
As regards the material scope of the protection afforded to employees under Article 3(3) of 
the Directive, it should be mentioned, firstly, that all employees’ rights arising from collective 
agreements, which are not covered by the exception in Article 3(4) of the Directive, are 
transferred to the transferee, including those that stem from statutory instruments.
164
Secondly, the transferee has the same possibility to amend the terms and conditions arising 
from collective agreements under Article 3(3) as he has under Article 3(1) of the Directive, 
i.e. in so far as national law allows for such alterations and provided that the transfer itself 
does not constitute the reason for the amendments.
165
However, this only applies during the 
period in which the transferee is bound by the collective agreement in force at the time of the 
transfer, since after the expiry of that period the transferee is free to amend the terms of 
conditions of the employees’ rights that derive from collective agreements.
166
Lastly, static 
incorporation clauses, i.e. clauses in contracts of employment which refer only to the 
collective agreement in force at the time of the transfer, are allowed under Article 3(3) of the 
Directive, whereas dynamic incorporation clauses, i.e. clauses in contracts of employment 
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which refer also to future collective agreements, are precluded, in situations when the 
transferee cannot participate in the negotiation process of the future collective agreements.
167
Most of the Court’s conclusions discussed above seem quite straightforward and unsurprising. 
Personal and temporal limitations are put on the transferee’s obligations and leeway is given 
to the transferee to amend terms and conditions of the employment relationship, since the 
Directive does not cover situations which are not connected with the transfer. At the same 
time, however, the Court is aware of the primary aim of the Directive to protect employees 
from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. In pursuing 
that aim, the Court makes clear that the protection afforded under the Directive cannot be 
circumvented by providing for a replacement of collective agreements, without respecting the 
aim of the Directive. Furthermore, the Court gives a broad meaning to the employees’ rights 
under Article 3(3). These conclusions all contain some kind of balancing and, taken as a 
whole, they seem to illustrate a fair balance between preserving the aim of protecting 
employees and not putting unreasonable burdens on the transferee.
There are, however, two judgments on Article 3(3) of the Directive where the Court makes 
specific reference to the need to balance the tension between the interests of the employees 
and the transferee. Werhof and Mark Alemo-Herron are of particular interest in this context 
and will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapters. 
5.2. The Balancing of Interests in the Light of the Aim and Nature of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive
As discussed above in chapter 2.2, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive has a somewhat 
dual purpose. It is the fruit of the common market thinking, as applied in the 1970s, and the 
functioning of the common market was the official justification, with Article 100 EEC being 
the legal basis.
168
It follows, however, from the Directive’s Preamble and Preparatory 
Documents that the predominant aim was protection of employees.
169
It is worth noting that
the fact that none of the Court’s cases on Article 3(3) of the Directive concerned a cross-
border transfer indicates that the importance of the Directive, at least from the perspective of 
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Article 3(3), is bigger when it comes to employment protection than with regard to internal 
market aspects.
170
There is nothing to indicate that the aim of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive has 
changed since its adoption in 1977. It is true that the 1990s witnessed a debate on the need for 
greater flexibility in the Union labour market and that in recent years the Union’s focus has 
been on the ‘flexicurity’ agenda, which combines employment and income security 
(employees’ interests) with flexibility in labour markets (employers’ interests) and 
emphasises the employability of workers generally, rather than being attached to a particular 
job with a particular firm.
171
It is also true that that Transfer of Undertakings Directive has 
been criticised by some for interfering with free enterprise, in particular by severely 
restricting employers in their ability to restructure their workforce.
172
Nevertheless, despite 
this criticism and the debates on flexibility and ‘flexicurity’, the relevant provisions for the 
purpose of this thesis and the reference to the Directive’s aim in the Preamble have remained 
largely unchanged since the Directive’s adoption in 1977. Furthermore, a change of direction 
or tone cannot be witnessed in the amendments from 1998 and 2001. On the contrary, the 
Commission stated in a Report from 2007 that it believed that the Directive, nearly 30 years 
after its adoption, still continued to play a key role in protecting employees’ rights.
173
Moreover, it has been held that the Directive in general has followed a logical path of 
evolution, as the Court has solved problems that have arisen by giving the provisions of the 
Directive an extensive and teleological interpretation, based on the aim of protecting 
employees’ rights.
174
It must, therefore, be held that the protection of employees remains the predominant aim of 
the Transfer of Undertakings Directive still today. However, the dual purpose that is inherent 
in the Directive, mentioned above, entails that the employment protection objectives of the 
Directive must be balanced with the need to minimise the disincentives to transferring 
business in an increasingly integrated European market.
175
Accordingly, although no specific 
reference is made in the Directive to the need to protect employers,
176
the protection of 
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employees under the Directive has its limits and must not put unreasonable burdens on the 
transferee, in order to encourage the restructuring of business in Europe. As stated in the 
Commission’s Report from 2007:
By achieving the correct balance between the protection of employees and the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity, the Directive has made a major contribution to ensuring that 
numerous restructuring operations in Europe are socially more acceptable.
177
As noted in chapter 4.1, Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive attempts to 
provide a compromise and strives to achieve a balance between the interests of the employees 
and the transferee. This is done through several employer protective elements, such as the 
possibility of joint transferor and transferee liability (second sub-paragraph of Article 3(1)) 
and the potential to limit the applicability of Article 3(3) to one year after the transfer (second 
sub-paragraph of Article 3(3)).
178
Furthermore, as discussed above in chapter 4.3.2, the 
protection afforded to employees under Article 3(3) is subject to temporal limitations, i.e. 
‘until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or 
application of another collective agreement’ (first sub-paragraph of Article 3(3)).
179
As already mentioned, the Court has referred to this balancing of interests, in the context of 
Article 3(3) of the Directive, in two judgments. In Werhof,
180
the reference to the balancing
was more indirect, as the Court stated that ‘although in accordance with the objective of the 
Directive the interests of the employees concerned by the transfer must be protected, those of 
the transferee, who must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to 
carry on his operations, cannot be disregarded.’
181
In Mark Alemo-Herron,
182
however, the 
Court stated explicitly that the Directive does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of 
employees but seeks to ensure a fair balance between the interests of employees, on the one 
hand, and those of the transferee, on the other.
183
In Werhof, Mr Werhof had tried to rely on the Transfer of Undertakings Directive to claim 
dynamic protection of his rights arising from a collective agreement although his contract of 
employment did not contain a dynamic clause referring to collective agreements. It is also 
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worth noting that Germany had used the possibility in the second sub-paragraph of Article 
3(3) to limit the period of validity of the collective agreement to a maximum period of one 
year after the transfer. In the light of those circumstances, the Court’s conclusion is not 
surprising. In seeking to strike a balance between the employees’ rights and the transferee’s 
freedom to organise its own business affairs, the Court ruled that a static interpretation of a 
contract clause such as the one in this case was not precluded by the Directive and, 
consequently, that a dynamic interpretation was not required.
184
In Mark Alemo-Herron, the circumstances were quite different. The employment contracts of 
Mark Alemo-Herron and his colleagues contained dynamic contractual clauses referring to 
future collective agreements. The UK had implemented the Transfer of Undertakings
Directive by means of the TUPE Regulations from 2006, which incorporated Article 3 of the 
Directive in substantively identical terms. The UK had, however, not taken advantage of the 
option in the second sub-paragraph of Article 3(3) of the Directive. The approach that had 
been taken by national courts, which can probably be explained in part by the flexible nature 
of the collective bargaining system in the UK,
185
was that transfers could also include 
dynamic clauses referring to future collective agreements.
186
The Court, however, found that a 
dynamic incorporation clause referring to future collective agreements in the public sector
would be liable to limit considerably the ‘room for manoeuvre necessary for a private 
undertaking to make [the necessary] adjustments and changes’ and would be ‘liable to 
undermine the fair balance between the interests of the transferee […] and those of the 
employees […]’.
187
The Court’s conclusion was that the dynamic incorporation clauses were 
precluded by the Directive.
188
Although the Court is correct in finding that a fair balance must be struck between the 
interests of the transferee and the employees, the Court’s reasoning seems particularly one-
sided. References to the need to ensure that the transferee can make ‘the adjustments and 
changes necessary to carry on its operations’ and has the necessary ‘room for manoeuvre’ are 
difficult to reconcile with the flexible nature of the collective bargaining system in the UK. 
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Since collective agreements in the UK do not have their legal basis in the law but in 
individual contracts of employment and since Article 3 of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive does not provide that the terms and conditions prior to the transfer must be 
preserved for eternity, nothing seems to prevent the parties from renegotiating the contractual 
clause that refers to the collective agreement, as long as such amendments are not made in 
connection with the transfer.
189
The language of the Court also indicates that there is a 
connection between high disparity in working conditions in a transfer (such as in transfers 
between public and private undertakings) and less protection for employees.
190
All this does 
not seem to fit well with the fact that the predominant aim of the Directive is the protection of 
employees. 
What is also interesting about the Court’s conclusion that dynamic incorporation clauses were 
precluded by the Directive is that UK law, as interpreted by the national courts,
191
allowed for 
dynamic incorporation clauses and, thus, entailed more favourable rights for employees than 
the Transfer of Undertakings Directive. As already mentioned, such more favourable national 
provisions are allowed under Article 8 of the Directive and are in line with the partial 
harmonisation nature of the Directive. That would mean that the Directive should act as a 
floor (minimum standards) and not as a ceiling (maximum standards) for national regulatory 
choices.
192
The Court, however, also based its conclusion on the reasoning that the provisions 
of the Directive had to be interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 16 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,
193
which precluded an interpretation that would allow for dynamic 
incorporation clauses. According to the Court, Article 8 of the Directive could not change that
conclusion.
194
Interestingly, this entails that the balancing of interests that the Court engages 
in here is not confined to establishing the minimum standards of protection under the 
Directive but goes beyond the scope and nature of the Directive to establish the ceiling of the 
protection that can be provided for employees. 
In his opinion in the Mark Alemo-Herron case, Advocate General Cruz Villalón adopts a 
similar approach but with a different method. He first concludes that there is nothing in the 
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Directive itself that prevents Member States from allowing the transfer of dynamic 
incorporation clauses,
195
but then goes on to assess whether that conclusions constitutes a 
breach of fundamental rights. He states that ‘even where European Union law expressly gives 
Member States freedom of action, this must be exercised in accordance with that law’, 
including fundamental rights.
196
He does not mention the balancing of interests explicitly, but 
his balancing of rights seems to take place within the context of Article 16 of the Charter and 
not under the Directive as such. 
It must also be mentioned that when looking at the Court’s case law regarding more 
favourable national provisions in the context of other Union legislation, the same approach 
can be found. In Lindqvist,
197
which concerned Directive 95/46/EC
198
on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, the Court held that nothing 
‘prevents a Member State from extending the scope of the national legislation implementing 
the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas not included within the scope thereof, provided that 
no other provision of Community law precludes it.’ Furthermore, in Rüffert,
199
the Court 
struck down national standards exceeding those laid down in Directive 96/71/EC
200
on the 
posting of workers. The general rule seems to be that Member States are allowed to maintain 
or introduce provisions which are more favourable for employees, as long as they are 
compatible with Union primary law, including fundamental rights.
201
Even though the balancing of interests which the Court claims to engage in Mark Alemo-
Herron has the effect of circumventing the nature of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 
as a partial harmonisation directive setting minimum standards, it must be considered the 
correct approach that an interpretation of a directive, and consequently also more favourable 
provisions which the directive allows for, must be compatible with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The conclusion of such balancing in the light of the Charter is what will 
be dealt with in the next chapter. 
5.3. The Balancing of Interests in the Light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights became a legally binding instrument on 1 December 
2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force.
202
Article 6(1) TEU provides that the ‘Union 
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
[…], which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. The Charter has, thus, been 
incorporated into the primary law of the Union, following long-drawn-out jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice based on the recognition of fundamental rights as general principles of 
Union law.
203
The Charter embodies in one document civil, political, economic and social 
rights. According to recital 5 in the Charter’s Preamble, the text of the Charter is based on 
various sources, such as the ECHR, and the social charters adopted by the Union and by the 
Council of Europe.
204
Article 51(1) of the Charter stipulates that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the 
institutions and bodies of the Union and to the Member States when they are implementing 
Union law. This undoubtedly covers Wachauf type of situations, i.e. the review of Member 
States measures when implementing Union law. A textual interpretation of Article 51(1) 
could suggest that the Charter does not apply in horizontal situations. Article 52(1) of the 
Charter, however, explicitly mentions ‘the need to protect the rights and freedom of others’, 
which indicates that the Charter may be applied in horizontal situations, i.e. in relationships 
between private parties.
205
It can, furthermore, be inferred from cases like Mangold
206
and 
Kücükdeveci
207
that fundamental rights appear to be applicable in horizontal situations when 
linked with the implementation of a Union directive.
208
Many examples can also be found 
where the Court has, in fact, applied the Charter in horizontal situations, such as e.g. Erny,
209
Scarlet Extended
210
and Sky Österreich.
211
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The Transfer of Undertakings Directive governs horizontal situations, i.e. employment 
relationships between private parties. It follows from the above-mentioned that the Charter 
can become applicable through the Court’s interpretation of the Directive in the context of 
Member States’ implementation of it.
212
The only case on Article 3(3) of the Directive where 
the Court makes a reference to the Charter is Mark Alemo-Herron. It should, however, be 
mentioned that in Scattolon, one question from the referring court concerned Articles 46, 47 
and 52(7) of the Charter.
213
Advocate General Bot had a detailed discussion on the 
applicability of the Charter and the interpretation of Article 47 in his opinion,
214
but the Court 
did not find it necessary to answer that question.
215
It is also worth noting that, although no reference was made to the Charter in Werhof, 
presumably since the Charter had not become legally binding at the time, fundamental rights 
did play a part in the Court’s conclusion. The Court stated that secondary legislation must be 
interpreted in accordance with the general principles of Community law and then referred to 
Article 11 of the ECHR on the freedom of association, which also includes the right not to 
join an association.
216
The Court’s conclusion that a dynamic interpretation of the contractual 
clause at issue could not be required was based on the fact that it would mean that the 
transferee would have been under an obligation to join a representative council, which would 
have amounted to a breach of Article 11 of the ECHR. Had this ruling been passed today, the 
Court would probably have referred to Article 12 of the Charter on the freedom of assembly 
and association, which, according to the Explanations to the Charter, corresponds to Article 
11 ECHR.
217
As discussed in chapter 5.2, the balancing undertaken by the Court in this case 
seems fair. Mr Werhof did not have a dynamic incorporation clause in his employment 
contract and, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the most natural conclusion was to 
adopt a static interpretation of the contractual clause, in particular since such a conclusion 
fully safeguarded the transferee’s right not to join an association.
218
In Mark Alemo-Herron, Article 12 of the Charter and the freedom of association was not 
relevant, as a result of the fact that a duty for the transferee to join an association was by 
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definition impossible, since a private sector employer could not join the NJC. As stated by 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón ‘the fundamental rights at issue is not the negative aspect of 
the employer’s freedom of association but rather the employer’s fundamental right to conduct 
a business, which is recognised by Article 16 of the Charter’.
219
Article 16 of the Charter stipulates that the ‘freedom to conduct a business in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. Although Article 16 represents the 
first time the freedom to conduct a business appeared in a legally binding instrument in the 
Union legal order, it had been given effect to by the Union also prior to the Charter.
220
It 
follows from the Explanations to the Charter that Article 16 is a codification of the Court’s 
case law and that it is based on a combination of three rights, i.e. the freedom to exercise an 
economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and the right to free competition.
221
Article 16 of the Charter has been applied by the Court in the context of interpreting Union
secondary legislation involving balancing of rights at the national level (like in Mark Alemo-
Herron) but also in situations concerning the validity of Union secondary legislation arising at 
the national level.
222
In Mark Alemo-Herron, the Court held that the freedom to conduct a business entails that, in 
the context of Article 3 of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the transferee ‘must be able 
to assert its interest effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to negotiate the 
aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a view to its 
future economic activity’. The Court found that, since the transferee in this case was unable to
participate in the collective bargaining body and, thus, unable to do those things, ‘the 
transferee’s contractual freedom is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is 
liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’. As a result of 
this Article 3 of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 8, could not be interpreted as 
allowing the Member States to provide for the transfer of dynamic incorporation clauses in 
such situations, as that would be liable to ‘adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s 
freedom to conduct a business’.
223
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This conclusion of the Court can be criticised on several points. Firstly of all, it is difficult to 
see how the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business would be affected
by the transfer of a dynamic incorporation clause and why the transferee should not be able to 
‘assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party’. As mentioned 
above in chapter 5.2, due to the flexible nature of the collective bargaining system in the UK, 
the transferee should be able to renegotiate the dynamic incorporation clauses with the 
employees at any time during the term of the employment contract.
224
Moreover, the Court’s 
reasoning is not in line with the ruling in Sky Österreich, where the discussion evolved around 
whether the relevant directive prevented a business activity from being carried out as such.
225
The transferee in Mark Alemo-Herron would hardly be prevented from carrying out its 
business activity as a result of a slight increase in hourly wages provided for in future 
collective agreements.
226
It must be held that the approach adopted by Advocate General Cruz Villalón on the issue of 
Article 16 of the Charter seems more sensible. His suggested conclusion was that Article 16 
‘does not preclude national legislation that requires the transferee of an undertaking to accept 
the existing and future terms and conditions agreed by a collective bargaining body, provided 
that the requirement is not unconditional and irreversible’. Although he states that it is for the 
national court to make that assessment, his reasoning points to the direction that in this case 
the requirement would not be unconditional and irreversible.
227
Another element of the Court’s ruling in Mark Alemo-Herron which deserves criticism is the 
fact that the Court seems to approach Article 16 of the Charter as an absolute fundamental 
right, which it is not.
228
That follows from the wording of Article 16, which subordinates the 
freedom to conduct a business to ‘Union law and national laws and practices’, and also from 
Article 52(1) of the Charter which enshrines the general limitations on the rights in the 
Charter.
229
Furthermore, the non-absoluteness of Article 16 of the Charter has been confirmed 
by the Court on many occasions. In Sky Österreich, the Court e.g. held that the freedom to 
conduct a business ‘is not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to its social function’ and 
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‘may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public authorities which may 
limit the exercise of economic activity in the public interest’.
230
In Mark Alemo-Herron, the Court makes no mention of Article 52(1) of the Charter, although 
Article 3 of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive seems to be able to fit within the scope of 
the permissible restrictions envisaged in that provision.
231
Nor is there any reference to the 
fact that Article 16 only recognises the freedom to conduct business ‘in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices’. Moreover, the Court fails to view the 
fundamental right contained in Article 16 of the Charter ‘in relation to its social function’.
The rights of the employees seem to be forgotten and no balancing of rights takes place.
232
Since a conflict of two or more fundamental rights should be resolved by striking a fair 
balance between them,
233
it is interesting to look at whether the employees’ rights protected 
by Article 3 of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive amount to fundamental social rights. 
It has become increasingly accepted as a cornerstone of European employment law that rights 
of individual employees, concerning access to employment, conditions of work and job 
security, may have a fundamental character.
234
Chapter IV of the Charter, entitled ‘Solidarity’,
contains provisions on individual employment, which are at the heart of employment law in 
Europe, such as e.g. workers’ rights to information and consultation within the undertaking 
(Article 27), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30) and fair and just 
working conditions (Article 31).
235
The Explanations to Articles 27 and 30 of the Charter
make reference to the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, but the rights contained in those 
provisions are not relevant for the purpose of this thesis.
236
Article 31 of the Charter, however, 
covers the important issues of health, safety, dignity (paragraph 1) and working time
(paragraph 2). It has been argued that the reference to ‘dignity’ in the text of Article 31(1) of 
the Charter allows for a broad interpretation of fair and just working conditions, even 
covering remuneration.
237
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46
Although it is not entirely certain that the rights of employees under Article 3 of the Transfer
of Undertakings Directive can be considered to fall within the scope of Article 31(1) of the 
Charter, the possibility that the rights in Article 3(3) of the Directive would be seen as 
principles of European social law has not been ruled out. In Dominguez,
238
a case of 24 
January 2012, the Court e.g. held that ‘the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave
must be regarded as a particularly important principle of European Union social law’, without 
mentioning Article 31(2) of the Charter in this respect.
239
In this context, mention should be made of the European Social Charter, adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1961 and revised in 1996 (often called the ‘social counterpart’ of the 
EHCR) and also of the Community Social Charter. Reference is made to those Charters in 
Article 151 TFEU, the Preamble to the TEU and the Preamble to the Charter, and they
constitute the main sources of the social provisions of the Charter.
240
The European Social Charter contains provisions on, inter alia, the right to just conditions of 
work (Article 2) and the right to a fair remuneration (Article 4). The Community Social 
Charter includes a large number of specific rights of individual employment, such as on 
employment and remuneration (Articles 4-6) and improvement of living and working 
conditions (Articles 7-9).
241
Although the Community Social Charter and the European Social Charter are not legally 
binding, the references to them in primary Union law give them greater weight than soft law 
normally has.
242
Those Charters, thus, form important tools for interpretation purposes in 
Union law, and have shown their value as such in the Court’s case law.
243
As for the 
Community Social Charter specifically it has proved to have legal consequences for the 
interpretation of Union secondary legislation and it has been argued that it supplements the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights when legislation is adopted covering social issues not 
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mentioned in the Charter.
244
In this context it is important to note that the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive does refer to the Community Social Charter in its Preamble.
245
In the light of the above-mentioned, it seems odd, to say the least, that the Court in Mark 
Alemo-Herron does not refer to the employees’ rights, which are presumably of a 
fundamental nature, in the context of its interpretation of Article 16 of the Charter, and no 
balancing of rights takes place. 
5.4. The Tension between Social and Economic Rights in the Light of Recent 
Developments – in Particular the Changes Brought about by the Lisbon Treaty
The previous chapter highlighted the Court’s failure in Mark Alemo-Herron to engage in a 
proper balancing of interests and to give sufficient weight to social rights of employees. In 
that case the tension concerned the (presumably) fundamental social (human) rights of 
employees versus the fundamental economic rights of employers (as undertakings). The 
freedom of movement was not at stake, since no cross-border element was present, and the 
case did not concern the tension between national interests and the competences of the Union.
Rather, Mark Alemo-Herron represented a conflict between social and economic rights in a 
horizontal, internal situation. In this light, it is appropriate to look at the issue of the tension 
between economic and social rights and interests in a broader context. 
In the past, social policy issues have remained subordinated to economic integration in the 
Union.
246
Chapter 2.1 of this thesis, however, demonstrates how the emphasis on social 
objectives and employees protection has increased steadily since the foundation of the 
European Economic Community. It has been held that the evolution of social policy at Union 
level comprises ever more rights for individuals and the pro-worker interpretation of those 
rights by the Court of Justice.
247
The Union is, thus, no longer seen as a predominantly 
economic organisation and European integration is no longer a purely economic project. On 
the contrary, the Union has shown that it is an organisation that takes its social dimension 
seriously, of which European employment law forms a central part, and that has reached a 
fairly balanced mutual relationship between economic and social factors.
248
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In that context, reference must also be made to some of the Court’s judgments, which confirm 
the above-mentioned dedication to social objectives. In Defrenne II,
249
a judgment from 1976, 
the Court found that Article 119 EEC
250
on the principle of equal pay for men and women
‘forms part of the social objectives of the Community, which is not merely an economic 
union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek 
the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples, as is 
emphasized by the Preamble to the Treaty.’
251
In Albany,
252
from 1999, the Court emphasised 
the social policy objectives, found in Article 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty, and held that those 
were to be given at least equal weight to competition policy objectives.
253
Furthermore, in 
Viking
254
and Laval,
255
the Court referred to the social purpose of the Union and found that 
free movement provisions must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy, 
such as improved living and working conditions, proper social protection and dialogue 
between management and labour.
256
It is worth noting that it has been argued that teleological 
interpretation and the dual social and economic aim in the field of social policy has dominated 
the Court’s case law in the field ever since the Defrenne II judgment.
257
It is, thus, clear that the importance of social policy in the Union has increased steadily during 
the past decades. It has, however, been argued that a decisive breakthrough in terms of social 
rights was made with the Lisbon Treaty. First of all, the Lisbon Treaty made a significant 
impact by giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the Treaties, 
which entails the recognition of social and employment rights on an equal footing with the 
economic ones.
258
It has been said that the recognition of the legally binding status of the 
Charter will inevitably shape Union social and employment law in the future, as it may serve 
to reinforce the Court’s teleological perspective in social and employment cases and influence 
the Court’s balancing of social and economic objectives underpinning much of secondary 
legislation.
259
To support this view is that fact that the Charter appears to be based on the 
principle of indivisibility of fundamental rights, putting social, economic, civil and political
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rights on the same level. This can be inferred from the Charter’s Preamble
260
and from the 
mere fact that including economic and social rights in the same document as civil and political 
rights is a novelty.
261
However, there are also factors which suggest that the impact of the Charter in the social 
sphere is less significant than one might otherwise think. The distinction drawn between 
rights and principles, also reflected in Article 52(5) of the Charter, is said to represent the 
lesser status of social rights and to limit the possibilities of redressing the imbalance between 
the economic and social dimension in the Union. Article 52(5) of the Charter, by providing
that ‘principles’ can only give rise to rights in so far as they are implemented by national law 
or Union law, was intended to ensure that the socio-economic principles, included mainly in 
the Solidarity Title, could not establish freestanding rights with direct effect.
262
Confusingly, 
however, neither the Charter nor the Explanations to it distinguish clearly which provisions 
contain rights and which contain principles and the issue has not been clarified by the Court’s 
case law either.
263
It seems, though, that many of the employment related provisions in the 
Charter are vague and not directly effective.
264
In that context, reference can e.g. be made to 
Association de médiation sociale,
265
where the Court found that Article 27 of the Charter on 
the right to information and consultation within the undertaking was not specific enough to 
have direct effect.
266
On the other hand, it follows from the Court’s case law that Article 16 of 
the Charter must be seen as a directly effective right.
267
Another factor is that, while the Charter does allow for a stronger protection of social rights, 
the fact remains that both economic and social rights are now regarded as fundamental. It has 
even been argued that the Charter, in e.g. Article 15 and 16, has upgraded the economic 
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principles (the fundamental freedoms) to full-fledged fundamental rights. This impacts the 
balancing of economic and social rights and makes such balancing difficult for the Court.
268
A second element which supports that the Lisbon Treaty has made a significant impact in the 
social sphere is that, through the new and amended provisions in Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU and 
Article 9 TFEU, it gave social policy a more prominent role in the values and objectives of 
the Union, as mentioned in chapter 2.1.
269
Article 2 TEU, inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, is the 
first provision that explicitly states the values of the Union in primary law. It comprises 
values which are relevant for social policy and, interestingly, the internal market or other 
economic values are not mentioned.
270
Article 3(3) TEU spells out the Union’s social 
objectives and, in defining its economic objectives, refers to their social implications as well.
The structure of the provision is said to indicate that the promotion of social objectives is an 
equally important goal of the Union as the establishment of the internal market.
271
Furthermore, the new reference to a ‘social market economy’, which is a catch-all expression 
intended to give simultaneous recognition to social and economic interests, is considered to be 
of specific importance.
272
Lastly, the new horizontal social clause in Article 9 TFEU requires 
the Union institutions, including the Court, to assess all their policies, laws and activities in 
light of the achievement of social goals. It can be said to represent a request to the Court to 
interpret Union law more in light of social objectives than it has done in the past.
273
It is true that Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU and Article 9 TFEU do not confer directly effective 
rights for individuals nor create new competences for the Union, and they will require firm 
commitment on behalf of the Union. Those provisions are, however, not mere rhetoric, but 
legal norms that have legal consequences.
274
It has been argued that these provisions,
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combined, may affect the balance between the economic and social dimension of the Union 
and contribute to a fundamental orientation towards social goals.
275
In the light of what has been discussed in this chapter, the Court’s failure in Mark Alemo-
Herron to give weight to the social rights of the employees as against the economic right of 
the transferee becomes even more striking. The Court, in its aggressive interpretation of 
Article 16 of the Charter, makes no reference to Article 2 TEU, Article 3(3) TEU or Article 9 
TFEU and ignores the fact that the Charter now also protects fundamental social rights, 
thereby failing to comply with the mandatory high level of social protection required after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
276
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis the case law of the Court on Article 3(3) of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive has been scrutinised with the aim of assessing how the Court has managed to 
balance the interests of employees and employers (transferees) in the event of transfers of 
undertakings. Overall, the Court appears to have succeeded in reaching a fair balance between 
those competing interests inherent in the Directive. The obligations of the transferees contain 
reasonable limitations concerning which employees are protected and for how long. 
Furthermore, a leeway is given to the transferees to make amendments to the terms and 
conditions of the employment relationship, which are not connected with the transfer, and a 
dynamic interpretation is not required of static incorporation clauses. At the same time, 
however, the Court is fully aware of the importance of respecting the predominant aim of the 
Directive, i.e. to protect employees from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a 
result of the transfer.
The judgment in Mark Alemo-Herron, however, does not fit this description of the Court’s 
case law as it, in the words of Prassl, ‘constitutes a radical break with the existing regime’
under the Directive.
277
The Court’s judgment in Mark Alemo-Herron is flawed in many 
respects and can be criticised on many grounds.
Firstly, as regards the balancing of the employees’ and transferee’s interests within the 
context of the Directive itself, the Court’s reasoning seems particularly one-sided, in favour of 
the transferee, despite the Court’s talk of ensuring a fair balance. This does not comply with 
the predominant aim of the Directive of protecting employees. Secondly, although it is correct 
that the Directive must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Charter, even though 
that results in establishing a ceiling of protection instead of a floor of protection, the Court’s 
interpretation and application of Article 16 of the Charter appears to be very far-reaching and 
in little conformity with the previous case law on the provision.
278
That is particularly so 
considering the circumstances of the case and the flexibility of the collective bargaining 
system in the UK. Thirdly, with regard to the balancing of interests in the light of the Charter, 
the Court fails seriously since no balancing at all seems to take place and no weight is given 
to the rights of the employees, despite the fact that those rights presumably possess a 
fundamental status and are possibly even protected under the Charter. Interestingly, this 
conclusion leads to the peculiar situation that an ordinary application of English contract law 
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gave significantly better protection for employees than the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
279
Finally, the Court’s failure to give weight to the social rights of the employees as against the 
economic right of the transferee fits poorly with the evolution of increased emphasis on social 
objectives and employees’ protection ever since the 1970s and fails to comply with the 
mandatory high level of social protection demanded by the Lisbon Treaty.
In the light of all this, it must be concluded that the Court fails in Mark Alemo-Herron in 
balancing the competing interests of employees and employers (transferees) inherent in the 
Transfer of Undertakings Directive. It is difficult to understand the reason for the Court’s 
approach and whether there is a hidden agenda, since the Court’s reasoning is sparse. One 
could speculate whether this judgment represents a change of direction and a general trend
towards giving the rights and interests of employers increased weight. It is also uncertain 
whether this judgment is a reflection of the fact that social rights in the Charter are of lesser 
significance than economic rights or whether the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty 
will, in fact, have little impact. What is known is that the Court’s judgment in Mark Alemo-
Herron has already begun to assert its influence. The UK has adopted new TUPE Regulations 
with effect from 31 January 2014, which reflect that judgment and incorporate the static 
approach, i.e. the transferee is no longer bound by changes to collective agreements 
negotiated and agreed after the date of the transfer where the transferee is not a party to the 
process.
280
One must only hope, though, that the judgment in Mark Alemo-Herron will be 
seen as an isolated case, read on its facts, and that, in the future, more weight will be given by 
the Court to the fundamental social rights of employees as against the fundamental economic 
rights of employers.
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